GE to Sara Sophia Hennell, Richmond, 9 October [1856]
Title
GE to Sara Sophia Hennell, Richmond, 9 October [1856]
Title
GE to Sara Sophia Hennell, Richmond, 9 October [1856]
Sender
George Eliot
Recipient
Sara Sophia Hennell
Date(s)
- 1856-10-09
Place
Richmond
Letter Content
GE to Sara Sophia Hennell, Richmond, 9 October [1856]
MS: Coventry City Libraries. Hitherto unpublished.
Richmond | October 9.
Dear Sara
I think the first part of Objection II 749 in both its forms is entirely without validity. First, what do you mean by the word uniform? If you mean by "a uniform plan" -- a plan, no one part of which defeats, or is incongruous with, another part, I do not see how this plan must necessarily exclude the coexistence of a race of creatures who are immortal with another race of creatures who are mortal. The conception of an all-wise Being does not compel us to suppose that he would endow all his creatures with the same duration of existence any more than with the same power of vision.
But if by "a uniform plan" you mean a plan that is persisted in, you have first to prove that the gift of immortality to man was an afterthought, before you can bring the Christian position within gunshot of your logical formula, that "a plan not uniform is not the best possible." The withholding of immortality from the brutes is not a proof that God "did not care for them," until you have shown that existence without immortality is a curse to them. In either case, however, "uniform" is a wrong word, and the clause -- "should reign through all his works" seems to imply that you use the word in the sense of congruous or consistent and not persistent.
I think we have not the slightest 'e0 priori ground for supposing that an all-wise Being would not will "man to be of an essentially different nature from other creatures." The 'e0 posteriori argument, that he has not willed it, is the only firm standing-ground, but this you introduce in a slight and subordinate way. I think you should keep the two species of argument distinct.
A priori arguments against Revelation have always seemed to me extremely weak. But I conclude that you are not speaking entirely from yourself, on the Infidel side, but are stating the argument advanced by Infidels? Is it so?
The second part of Objection II. 750 is rather confused in its first sentence. Do you mean that Revelation came in place of "those instinctive impulses" etc. -- or that there was given to man, in place of those instinctive impulses etc. an independent, godlike power of his own. The sentence must be differently turned somehow.
I am unable to speak with any advantage on the Objections, because I don't know your plan, and what may be coming next. But it appears to me that they cannot be consistently classed as "against Revelation in general." Revelation in general is the idea of revelation abstracted from any particular system claiming to be a revelation, but your Objection III. 751 at least, is specifically against the Hebrew Revelation. You must make it clear whether you mean by the God of Revelation, a God who reveals himself, or the God supposed to be revealed in the Scriptures.
The 'e0 priori arguments against revelation in the abstract should come first, and be quite distinct from the others. Then should come the 'e0 priori arguments against the Hebrew and Christian scheme -- Fall of man, confinement of Rev. to one people, etc., etc., and then the 'e0 posteriori arguments. But I am writing hurriedly, from an imperfect knowledge of your plan and an imperfect consideration of the subject.
Pray understand that I do not offer my criticism as worth more than the suggestions of a reader who may help you to guard against the cavils of other readers.
No more just now, because it is working time.
Ever thine
Pollian.
Do not hesitate to ask me about anything in which I can possibly be a criticometer.
MS: Coventry City Libraries. Hitherto unpublished.
Richmond | October 9.
Dear Sara
I think the first part of Objection II 749 in both its forms is entirely without validity. First, what do you mean by the word uniform? If you mean by "a uniform plan" -- a plan, no one part of which defeats, or is incongruous with, another part, I do not see how this plan must necessarily exclude the coexistence of a race of creatures who are immortal with another race of creatures who are mortal. The conception of an all-wise Being does not compel us to suppose that he would endow all his creatures with the same duration of existence any more than with the same power of vision.
But if by "a uniform plan" you mean a plan that is persisted in, you have first to prove that the gift of immortality to man was an afterthought, before you can bring the Christian position within gunshot of your logical formula, that "a plan not uniform is not the best possible." The withholding of immortality from the brutes is not a proof that God "did not care for them," until you have shown that existence without immortality is a curse to them. In either case, however, "uniform" is a wrong word, and the clause -- "should reign through all his works" seems to imply that you use the word in the sense of congruous or consistent and not persistent.
I think we have not the slightest 'e0 priori ground for supposing that an all-wise Being would not will "man to be of an essentially different nature from other creatures." The 'e0 posteriori argument, that he has not willed it, is the only firm standing-ground, but this you introduce in a slight and subordinate way. I think you should keep the two species of argument distinct.
A priori arguments against Revelation have always seemed to me extremely weak. But I conclude that you are not speaking entirely from yourself, on the Infidel side, but are stating the argument advanced by Infidels? Is it so?
The second part of Objection II. 750 is rather confused in its first sentence. Do you mean that Revelation came in place of "those instinctive impulses" etc. -- or that there was given to man, in place of those instinctive impulses etc. an independent, godlike power of his own. The sentence must be differently turned somehow.
I am unable to speak with any advantage on the Objections, because I don't know your plan, and what may be coming next. But it appears to me that they cannot be consistently classed as "against Revelation in general." Revelation in general is the idea of revelation abstracted from any particular system claiming to be a revelation, but your Objection III. 751 at least, is specifically against the Hebrew Revelation. You must make it clear whether you mean by the God of Revelation, a God who reveals himself, or the God supposed to be revealed in the Scriptures.
The 'e0 priori arguments against revelation in the abstract should come first, and be quite distinct from the others. Then should come the 'e0 priori arguments against the Hebrew and Christian scheme -- Fall of man, confinement of Rev. to one people, etc., etc., and then the 'e0 posteriori arguments. But I am writing hurriedly, from an imperfect knowledge of your plan and an imperfect consideration of the subject.
Pray understand that I do not offer my criticism as worth more than the suggestions of a reader who may help you to guard against the cavils of other readers.
No more just now, because it is working time.
Ever thine
Pollian.
Do not hesitate to ask me about anything in which I can possibly be a criticometer.
Signature
Pollian.
Citation
George Eliot, GE to Sara Sophia Hennell, Richmond, 9 October [1856], Complete George Eliot Letters(2026), George Eliot Archive, edited by Beverley Park Rilett. https://GeorgeEliotArchive.org, Accessed September 7, 2026. https://www.georgeeliotarchive.org/items/show/94110