GE to Frederic Harrison, Rickmansworth, 18 June 1875
Title
GE to Frederic Harrison, Rickmansworth, 18 June 1875
Title
GE to Frederic Harrison, Rickmansworth, 18 June 1875
Sender
George Eliot
Recipient
Frederic Harrison
Date(s)
- 1875-06-18
Place
Rickmansworth
Letter Content
GE to Frederic Harrison, Rickmansworth, 18 June 1875
MS: Tinker Collection, Yale. Envelope: Frederic Harrison Esq | 1 Southwick Place | Hyde Park Square | London | W. Postmarks: RICKMANSWORTH | C | JU 18 | 75; F | WATFORD | JU 18 | 75; LONDON-W. | F7 | JU 19 | 75. Hitherto unpublished.
The Elms | Rickmansworth | June 18. 75.
Dear Mr. Harrison
Thanks for the additional important paper received this morning. In the statement grounded on the act, 1833, the words: "Every tenant for life whether in possession, remainder, contingency or otherwise can dispose of lands entailed as against all persons whose estates come after his, saving the rights of all persons whose estates come prior to his" -- are clear to me considered as a warrant and limitation for G's side of the transaction with Sir H.
But in other relations the wording puzzles me, because it seems in contradiction with the inability of a tenant for life to do anything in the way of disposal without the consent of his extant successor. Of course there is no real contradiction and you need not trouble yourself to explain if, as I imagine, there is nothing to affect my previous conception of the case between Sir H. and G.
That conception is, that Sir H. is tenant for life, and can dispose of no lands, without the consent of G. who is tenant in tail, and who, if he chooses, could have his own right or anybody else's except that of Sir H's (legally) possible son.
Is it also correct to conceive that G's ability to dispose of the entailed lands would cease on the birth of a son 277 to himself, that son's existence as tenant in tail constituting his father's interest a tenancy for life?
Or is it that every right of succession included in the settlement is a mere tenancy for life? -- But if so, what becomes of the limiting distinction by which a tenant for life has his hands tied, while his successor may bar the entail?
You understand that my difficulty lies in the wording above cited, which seems to nullify the distinction between a life-interest and absolute possession. But do not worry yourself to answer unless there be danger of a practical qui pro quo on my part.
Always gratefully yours
M. E. Lewes.
P.S. on second thought:
I should like to be clear on that point -- whether after G. had a son born to him on his approaching marriage, his power of parting with his right over the portion of entailed property would cease until the son came of age and could concur.
MS: Tinker Collection, Yale. Envelope: Frederic Harrison Esq | 1 Southwick Place | Hyde Park Square | London | W. Postmarks: RICKMANSWORTH | C | JU 18 | 75; F | WATFORD | JU 18 | 75; LONDON-W. | F7 | JU 19 | 75. Hitherto unpublished.
The Elms | Rickmansworth | June 18. 75.
Dear Mr. Harrison
Thanks for the additional important paper received this morning. In the statement grounded on the act, 1833, the words: "Every tenant for life whether in possession, remainder, contingency or otherwise can dispose of lands entailed as against all persons whose estates come after his, saving the rights of all persons whose estates come prior to his" -- are clear to me considered as a warrant and limitation for G's side of the transaction with Sir H.
But in other relations the wording puzzles me, because it seems in contradiction with the inability of a tenant for life to do anything in the way of disposal without the consent of his extant successor. Of course there is no real contradiction and you need not trouble yourself to explain if, as I imagine, there is nothing to affect my previous conception of the case between Sir H. and G.
That conception is, that Sir H. is tenant for life, and can dispose of no lands, without the consent of G. who is tenant in tail, and who, if he chooses, could have his own right or anybody else's except that of Sir H's (legally) possible son.
Is it also correct to conceive that G's ability to dispose of the entailed lands would cease on the birth of a son 277 to himself, that son's existence as tenant in tail constituting his father's interest a tenancy for life?
Or is it that every right of succession included in the settlement is a mere tenancy for life? -- But if so, what becomes of the limiting distinction by which a tenant for life has his hands tied, while his successor may bar the entail?
You understand that my difficulty lies in the wording above cited, which seems to nullify the distinction between a life-interest and absolute possession. But do not worry yourself to answer unless there be danger of a practical qui pro quo on my part.
Always gratefully yours
M. E. Lewes.
P.S. on second thought:
I should like to be clear on that point -- whether after G. had a son born to him on his approaching marriage, his power of parting with his right over the portion of entailed property would cease until the son came of age and could concur.
Signature
M. E. Lewes.
Citation
George Eliot, GE to Frederic Harrison, Rickmansworth, 18 June 1875, Complete George Eliot Letters(2026), George Eliot Archive, edited by Beverley Park Rilett. https://GeorgeEliotArchive.org, Accessed September 7, 2026. https://www.georgeeliotarchive.org/items/show/92422